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Recent Interpretations of the Foundations of 
.. · · ·. the Metaphysics of Morals 




The "Standard Interpretation" of the Fou11datio11s 
During the twentieth century, the English language philosophical 
world developed a "standard interpretation" of Kant's ethics, focuse~ 
on the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals as its central text. 
There is a large body of secondary literature, the work both of Kant 
scholars and of moral philosophers, which has articulated and 
developed the standard interpretation and has pointed out the key 
texts that lend it plausibility. In the last thirty or so years, however, 
other scholars have opened up a new horizon on Kant's ethics which 
encourages readers of the Foundations to re-think a number of the 
central claims made by the standard interpretation. In this essay, I will 
thus first sketch key features the standard interpretation as it is often 
presented in textbooks, in undergraduate courses in ethics and the 
history of modern philosophy, and even in graduate level courses on 
Kant. In the second section of the essay, I will then sketch a new 
horizon .against which recent scholarshif invites us to read the 
Foundatwns of the Metaphysics of Morals. 
The basic claims of the standard interpretation are: 
• The principal text that contains the essential elements of 
Kant's ethics is The Foundations of the Metaphysics of 
Morals, a work that Kant published in 1785. 
• The primary emphasis in Kant's ethics is on the formal 
features of our moral concepts and reasoning--in particular, 
their universality and their unconditional necessity. 
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• Kant seeks to derive the specific requirements of moral life 
from the Categorical Imperative, which is a formal statement 
ofwhat he takes to be the supreme principle of morality. 
• Parallel to this emphasis on formality, Kant is most 
fundamentally interested in (moral) rationality as such, rather 
than in the particular features of human moral rationality. In 
other words, Kant's ethics does not involve a moral 
anthropology and! or a theory of human nature. 
• Kant's ethical system is primarily a deontological one; it 
emphasizes the concept of moral rightness and the obligation 
consequent upon it. It thus gives little or no place to notions of 
human good and or even moral goodness, especially if these 
concepts arise from a teleological understanding of human 
nature. 
• Kant has profound reservations about the role and the worth of 
human inclinations and desires in the making of moral 
choices. He holds that it is the fact that we have sensible 
inclinations that leads us to make choices that go against our 
moral obligations 
• The notion of autonomy most fundamentally concerns the 
moral integrity of the individual choices I make as a moral 
agent; and, it is a notion that stands in contrast to t~e 
requirements on my action that are based on my relationship 
to a society or a community. And, finally, 
• Kant's ethics can stand apart from the larger philosophical 
claims he makes in the other parts of his "critical project." 
One can thus be a Kantian in ethics without having to be a 
Kantian on other philosophical topics, such as questions of 
epistemology or metaphysics. 
For the sake of clarity and simplicity, I think it will be helpful to boil 
this list down to three key claims: 
1. Kant's ethics, inasmuch as it is concerned with the formal 
features of human rationality, does not require us to have a 
notion of human nature or to develop a moral anthropology. 
2. Kant's ethics, inasmuch as it is deontological and concerned 
with what is "right", stands as the paradigmatic contrast to 
Chiedza,]ournal of Arrupe College, Vo/17, No.1, December 2014 
76 
Rossi- Expanding the Horizon 
teleological ethics, concerned with what is '"good," such as 
that found in Aristotle. 
3. Kant's ethics, inasmuch as it is concemcd with the moral 
integrity of individual choices I make as a moral agent, 
requires neither the development of an account of moral virtue 
nor a social philosophy. 
The strength of the .. standard view" lies in the fact that most of its 
claims can be supported from the text that it normally takes to be 
definitive of Kant's ethics, The Foundations of tht' .\fetaphysics of 
Morals. In fact, most of its claims can be supported from the first two 
parts of that work, without having to delve into the conceptually more 
complex third part, where Kant wrestles--neither for the first time nor 
for the last time--with the concept of freedom. In the text of t~e 
Foundations, one finds a Kant who clearly emphasizes the formahty 
of his inquiry into human moral life; a Kant who emphatically states 
that his project does not require a moral anthropology because it is a 
~roject that concerns morality as it applies to all rational beings, not 
JUst to the specific kind of rational beings humans are; a Kant who, to 
sho:V ~hat it is the form of the law which imposes categorical 
obh.g~t10n on us, would have us put aside, in the making of our m~ral 
decl~lOn~, a~l considerations of the good to which teleology, destre, 
~nd.mc~matlon draw us; a Kant who seems deeply suspicious of our 
mclmatiOns because of the power they have to draw us away from 
what we ought to do; a Kant who, following the various formal 
state~ents of the Categorical Imperative, then seems to employ them 
to denve particular kinds of duties incumbent upon us. 
This strength of the standard view--that it finds support for most of its 
claims in a single work of Kant--and in a work that is brief and, by 
comparison to a work such as the Critique of Pure Reason, relative~y 
accessible in its content and argumentation even to a novice Ill 
philosophy--is, not surprisingly, one of its weaknesses as well. Since 
Kant continued to write about fundamental questions in ethics and the 
moral life for almost a decade and a half after the publication of the 
Groundwork, it is quite appropriate to ask the following questions: 
What if The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals does not by 
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itself contain the definitive statement of Kant's ethics? What if it 
represents just one step in the development of Kant's thinking about 
human moral life, a development which does not get completed until 
sometime in the next decade and for which writings from that later 
period are crucial--writings such as the Critique of Practical Reason 
(1788), the Critique of Judgment (1790), Religion within the Limits of 
Reason Alone (1793), and the book promised in the Foundations of 
1785 but not produced until 1797, The Metaphysics of Morals? What 
if, in these later writings, Kant changed his views on some key 
matters? 
These are clearly crucial questions--and they are precisely the ones 
that more recent scholarship on Kant has been asking. This new 
horizon on Kant does not deny that the Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Moral is a defining text for Kant's ethics. But it does 
propose that we read this text against the background of other writings 
of Kant that are also fundamental for understanding his ethics. This 
simple shift in perspective-from a fixed focus on the Foundations to 
placing it against the larger horizon of Kant's other writings in ethics-
-has significant consequences for the way one reads even the text of 
the Foundations itself. One begins to notice "new" things in the text: 
things that Kant clearly says but to which the "standard 
interpretation" has generally paid little attention. 
Before I set forth some details of this new horizon for rea~ing .the 
Foundations let me say something further about the la~ger h1st~nc~l 
framework for Kant's writings out of which it anse~. !his IS 
important because this new horizon stresses the contmUity and 
interconn~ction among Kant's various writings--especially those 
which were published between 1781 and 1798-i.e., from the 1st 
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason until a few years before Kant's 
death in 1804. There is substantial evidence, both in Kant's published ' 
writings and in his correspondence, that, as early as the 1760s, he had 
planned to write a major treatise in moral philosophy. There is also 
substantial evidence that his thinking about moral philosophy and its 
role within his larger philosophical project of critique went through a 
number of changes between the 1760s and the publication, some 
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twenty years later, of the Foundations. Finally. there is evidence 
within the text of his writings that, subsequent to the publication of 
the Foundations, he has to rethink both the arguments and the major 
concepts he presented in that work. The first mstance of such 
rethinking is the Critique of Practical Reason (I 788), but the 
rethinking continues through the Critique of Judgment ( 1790) and into 
Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone ( 1793) and The 
Metaphysics of Morals ( 1797), as well as in some of the essays, such 
as "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View" 
(1784) and "Perpetual Peace" ( 1795), that he published from the mid-
1780s into the 1790s. As a result, one major question that this new 
interpretation poses is whether it docs full justice to Kant's moral 
philosophy to take the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals as 
the only text from which to interpret any or all of the others. As one 
distinguished Kant scholar, Allen Wood, has put it: What is the final 
form of Kant's practical, (i.e., moral) philosophy? Wood's answer, 
interestingly enough, proposes that the final form of Kant's moral 
philosophy is at least as likely to be found in the 1797 Metaphysics of 
Morals-a long work which only the most dedicated of Kant students 
ever read in its entirety-as it is in the 1785 Foundation of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, which just about every undergraduate student 
who takes a course in ethics is likely to read--at least in part! 3 
Neither this question-nor the answer Wood gives-is intended to 
do~play the significance of the Foundations as a text in which Kant 
articulate~ some of the fundamental concepts of his ethics. In fact, the 
scho~arsh1p proposing this new horizon is more likely to argue that 
pla.c~ng the Foundations against the larger context of Kant's other 
wntmgs enables us to see it as an even richer source for the study of 
Kanfs ethics, even as we recognize that it does not, by itself, provide 
us the full picture. 
A New Horizon for Reading Kant's Ethics 
Let me now tum to a sketch of this new horizon. First, it is important 
to mention the names of some of the scholars whose work has 
contributed to its development. One important group consists of 
students of John Rawls at Harvard: Onora O'Neill, Constructions of 
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Reason; Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment; Thomas 
Hill, Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory; Christine 
Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends; Susan Neiman, The Unity 
of Reason and Evil in Modern Thought; Allen Wood, Kant's Moral 
Religion; Kantian Ethics; Paul Guyer, Kant and the Experience of 
Freedom; Keith Ward, The Development of Kant's View of Ethics; 
Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory; An Introduction to Kant's 
Ethics; Allen Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought; Richard Velkley, 
Freedom and the End of Reason; Michel Despland, Kant on History 
and Religion; Patrick Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy; Nancy 
Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue; Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics 
Almost without Apology; Robert Louden, Kant's Impure Ethics; 
Felicitas Munzel, Kant's Concept of Moral Character and Jeanine 
Grenberg, Kant and the Ethics of Humility4 deal with questions about 
Kant's treatment of sensibility, inclinations, virtue and character-
topics about which the standard interpretation often found little of 
substance in Kant's writings. Finally, there have been influential 
studies that have, from a variety of interpretive perspectives, have 
highlighted-in contrast to a tradition of Kant interpretation that 
construes his account of autonomy in individualistic terms-the social 
character of Kant's ethics. A notable precursor for this line of 
interpretation can be found in Lucien Goldmann, Immanuel Kant; 
Sharon Anderson Gold, Unnecessary Evil; Philip J. Rossi, The Social 
Authority of Reason; Pablo Muchnik, Kant's Theory of Evil; Stephen 
Engstrom, The Form of Practical Knowledge and Sidney Axinn, 
Autonomy and Community5 in which many contributors challenge the 
antithesis between autonomy and community that is frequently 
presupposed in the standard interpretation. 
This new horizon encompasses a wide range of topics within Kant's 
ethics. A brief discussion of three of the most important ones-
formality, anthropology, and teleology-- should be sufficient, 
however, to indicate how it can help to expand our understanding of 
the Foundations. The first topic this new horizon encourages us to 
rethink is the so-called "formality" of Kant's ethics. This has been 
recognized--almost from the publication of the Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morals--as one of its significant strengths and also as 
Chiedza,journal of Arrupe College, Vo/17, No.1, December 2014 
80 
Rossi- Expanding the Horizon 
one of its major weakness. Hegel, who can legitimately be considered 
to be the most powerful thinker among Kant's successors, severely 
criticized the "emptiness" of the Categorical Impt:rative even as he 
recognized that, by its formulation, Kant had articulated an important 
moment in the unfolding of reason's consciousness of itself. The 
formality of Kant's ethics consists in his proposing a general, abstract 
criterion or test by which to measure any or all of our proposals for 
moral action: can it be "universalized?" Am I able and willing to 
make the particular action I am proposing to do one which every else, 
in similar circumstances ought also to do, without exception? 
Behind this general, abstract test of our decisions (or. to use Kant's 
own technical terms, our "maxims")--so the "standard interpretation" 
holds--lies Kant's understanding of "rationality"' as a formal, abstract 
procedure (or a set of rules) which is not affected by the specifics of 
our human condition. I perform this test, and make my decision as "a 
moral agent"--i.e., as one who can see him/herself as abstracted from 
the particularities of this time and this place--or, to use another key 
term of Kant's, I make my moral decisions as a member of a timeless 
"intelligible world." Posed in these terms, Kant's account of morality 
seems quite literally abstracted from the flesh and blood reality of 
human beings who have to make moral decisions in the concrete 
circumstan~es o~ the here and now of daily life. If, to this picture of 
~bst:act. ratlOnahty, we add Kant's negative assessment of the value of 
mclmatlons such as benevolence and sympathy in the determination 
of ~he moral worth of our proposals for action, it is quite easy. to 
beheve that Kant's ethics are those of a cold and stem Prusstan 
taskmaster, an ethics suited more to the disembodied rationality of 
angels than to living and breathing human beings. Even more 
damaging and damning, the formality of Kant's ethics leads some to 
hold that it lies behind the pleadings of the Eichmanns of the world: "I 
was only carrying out my orders." 
In the face of this picture of abstract rationality, what does more 
recent scholarship on Kant's ethics say? One of the first things it says 
is: look at Kant's texts to see if this is, indeed, what he says about 
"how to make our moral decisions." When we follow this advice, it 
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turns out that results are a bit surprising. It turns out that Kant, rarely, 
if ever, tells us how to make our moral decisions. He rarely, if ever, 
tells us that the proper way to form our maxims is to imagine 
ourselves as disembodied spirits--and the relative absence of such an 
abstractly rational "decision making procedure" holds true even in the 
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. What Kant does say, 
instead, is let us carefully examine (his term is "analyze") the moral 
decisions we actually make to see what principles of action are 
already functioning in them. If we do this, we will see that what is 
already present in those decisions is an awareness that our actions 
already stand under the fundamental principle of morality--the 
principle that Kant calls the Categorical Imperative. If we look 
carefully at what Kant says, we will see that he advances very modest 
claims about what his philosophical work in Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morals seeks to do and what it accomplishes. He does 
not claim to have discovered a "new" principle for our moral 
decision-making. All that he claims he has done (at least in the first 
two parts) is simply give a proper philosophical formulation to a 
principle that we already employ whenever we make a morally 
worthy and proper decision. It is a principle, moreover, of which we 
are also (always) aware even when our decision is not one that is 
morally worthy and proper. 
This rethinking of the formality of Kant's ethics has implications for 
the second topic, namely, whether his ethics requires a philosophical 
anthropology. Once we become alert to what Kant understands 
himself to be doing in this text, we begin to see things--important 
things in the text--that we are likely to overlook by following only the 
standard interpretation. Among those important things are elements in 
Kant's discussion which indicate that his ethics is quite deeply rooted 
in a certain way of understanding the specific and unique character of 
our human condition and our human rationality--i.e., in an 
anthropology. Let me suggest just a couple of these since they will, in 
their tum, provide a way to say a few things, in conclusion, about the 
third heading, teleology, under which this new horizon expands our 
view of Kant's ethics beyond that provided by the standard 
interpretation. 
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The first, and perhaps most important, "anthropological" element to 
note in Kant's discussion is the deep respect that he has for "ordinary" 
moral knowledge and judgment. We can become so accustomed to the 
view that Kant's arguments function on a high level of abstraction that 
we can easily miss the fact that, a crucial points of his arguments, he 
makes a direct appeal to such things as "the common idea of duty and 
moral laws" ( Gr 4: 389), "natural sound understanding'' ( Gr 4: 397), 
''the common reason of mankind" (Gr 4:. 402), and "the moral 
knowledge of common human reason" ( Gr 4: 403 ). Such appeals are 
not simply matters of rhetoric; we have Kant's own testimony that it 
was his reading of Rousseau that was crucial in the development of 
his own appreciation of the humanity in every individual, whatever 
his or her status or condition in society.6 Such appeals, however, are 
also problematic, in view of the fact that, in the very same text of the 
Foundations, Kant also insists that what he is doing does not rest on 
"anthropology" (Gr 4:389). On this point, what I have been calling a 
"new horizon" on Kant raises some rather intriguing questions about 
the consistency between what Kant claims to be· doing--and the way 
he actually proceeds in his arguments. For it does seem that what 
Kant ~s actually doing in such appeals to ordinary moral judgment and 
exp.enence--despite his claims to the contrary--is proceeding on the 
basis ?f wh~t is, at least implicitly, an anthropology--an accoun~ of 
what Is specific to us as the kind of finite embodied rational bemgs 
that we are. ' · 
Wh~n we place Kant's ethics within the larger context of his critical 
proJect, the fact that it is deeply embedded in his anthropology should 
not be all that surprising. This is so because--at least in my judgment--
Kant's w~ole. critical project is anthropological. -His fundamental 
concern Is With the unique position human beings occupy in the 
cosmos· h · · · 
. · umamty IS the one species we know in which there lS a junc~re .between nature and freedom--and the "vocation" our human 
sp~cies Is to bring about the conditions under which freedom and 
nh~ uhre work t~gether for the attainment of what Kant terms "the 
tg est good" The · t ·n 
which K . re Is, moreover, an especially well known tex I 
ant expresses this anthropological focus--the text in which he 
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poses the three questions which he sees guiding his critical project: 
What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope for? 8 The 
new horizon on Kant's ethics seeks to remind us that he takes the 
three questions to be interconnected, that the point of the first two is 
to make it possible for us to answer the third, and all three questions, 
as he notes in his Lectures on Logic, are summed up in a fourth 
question: \\'hat is the human being?9 
This, finally, gets us to teleology. If it is the case, as I have been 
suggesting, that Kant's ethics is anthropological--at least in the sense 
that it is a component of his larger critical project, which has a 
fundamental anthropological thrust--then we also have to 
acknowledge that Kant's ethics is teleological as well. This is so 
because his anthropology is thoroughly teleological. For Kant, it is 
quite clear that human beings have an end--and a quite momentous 
end--to which they and their activities are ordered both by the 
workings of nature and by the exercise of human moral freedom. 
Here, once more, we have to go back to the simple principle--look at 
Kant's text--to show the presence of teleology at this most basic level 
of Kant's thinking. The standard interpretation has generally 
encouraged us to pass over lightly discussions, such as the one found 
at the beginning of the first part of the Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morals ( Gr 4; 395-396), in which Kant speaks of the 
purposes of nature with respect to our human capacities of reason and 
will (i.e., "practical reason"). In tending to dismiss or explain away 
these passages, I believe that the "standard interpretation" turns its 
"lens" for reading Kant into a "mirror": Since we, good citizens of the 
scientific culture of the 20thand 21st centuries can no longer take the 
notion of nature's purposes seriously, we have to prescind from that 
in interpreting Kant's text; Kant would have known better if he were 
living today. The problem with this move, however, is that the text 
makes it clear that Kant took quite seriously the notion that reason--
and specifically the kind of reason human beings have--has a purpose 
which is given to it by nature. It is a purpose, moreover, with which 
much of his later work on the critical project, such as the Critique of 
Judgment, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, and the 
occasional essays on the topics of politics and history are centrally 
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concerned: The attainment of the highest good for humanity as a 
species. 
There is much more that can be said about these ami other elements of 
the new horizon on Kant developed in recent scholarship. Above and 
beyond the particular points these scholars propose, however, is the 
crucial activity they ask of us in dealing with Kant's work: to look 
closely and carefully at what Kant writes. That is not so much a new 
horizon as it is an old and still sound principle for effective learning 
and for good scholarship. We should have no hcsit:.Hion in applying it 
to our study of Kant. 
1 The number of English translations and editions of Kant's 1785 
GrundlegungzurMetaphysik der Sitten that have been issued since the 
~econd half of the twentieth century provides one marker of the 
Importance and widespread use of this text. The title has been variously 
translated as The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
The Grou~dwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and the Foundations of the 
Metaphystcs of Morals. A late nineteenth century translation was by 
Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (1889), followed a half century later by Otto 
Manthey-Zorn (1938). Since H. J. Paton's translation, titled The Moral Law 
(1948), there have been no less than six more: Lewis White Beck (1959), 
Brendan E. A. Liddell (1970), James w. Ellington (1981), and Mary Gregor 
(1998), including two new ones so far in the twenty-first century, one by 
Allen W. Wood (2002), the other by Arnulf Zweig (2002). 
2 Kant's text will be cited as Gr, with page references to Volume 4 of ~he 
critical German edition, KantsGesammelteSchriften, Berlin: Pruss1an 
Academy of Sciences, 1903, 1911. The translations in the text are based 
on Abbott's translation. 
3 For Wood's exploration of this question see "The Final Form of Kan_t's 
Practical Philosophy," in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretwe 
Essays, ed. Mark Timmons, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002, PP· 
1-22. 
4 Onora O'Neill (Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical 
Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Barbara 
Herman (The Practice of Moral Judgment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1993), Thomas Hill (Dignity and Practical Reason in 
Kant's Moral Theory, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), Christine 
Korsgaard (Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996); of special note is the work of Susan Neiman (The 
Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant, New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
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Press, 1994 and Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of 
Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). Other scholars 
whose work has contributed to developing this new perspective include 
Allen Wood (Kant's Moral Religion, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970; 
Kantian Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Paul 
Guyer (Kant and the Experience of Freedom, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), Keith Ward (The Development of Kant's View of 
Ethics, Blackwell, 1972), and Roger Sullivan (Immanuel Kant's Moral 
Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Sullivan's shorter 
study, An Introduction to Kant's Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994) Is an excellent text for introducing undergraduates to Kant's 
moral philosophy. Allen Wood's Kant's Ethical Thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999) is probably the best single volume 
commentary on Kant's ethics available in English. Important studies 
placing Kant's ethics within the larger context of his critical project have 
been written by Richard Velkley (Freedom and the End of Reason: On the 
Moral Foundation of Kant's Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1989), Michel Despland (Kant on History and Religion, Montreal: 
MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1973), and Patrick Riley (Kant's Political 
Philosophy, Rowman and Littlefield, 1983). Studies by Nancy Sherman 
(Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), Marcia Baron (Kantian Ethics Almost 
without Apology, Ithaca: Cornell, 1995), Robert Louden, (Kant's Impure 
Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings, New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), Felicitas Munzel (Kant's Concept of Moral 
Character: The "Critical" Link of Morality, Anthropology, and Reflective 
Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), and Jeanine 
Grenberg (Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, 
Corruption and Virtue, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
5 Lucien Goldmann, Immanuel Kant (London: NLB, 1971); more recent 
contributions have been made by Sharon Anderson Gold (Unnecessary 
Evil: History and Moral Progress in the Thought of Immanuel Kant 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2001), Philip J. Rossi (The Social Authority of 
Reason, Albany: SUNY Press, 2005), Pablo Muchnik, (Kant's Theory of 
Evil, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), and, from an analytic 
perspective, Stephen Engstrom (The Form of Practical Knowledge: A 
Study of the Categorical Imperative, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2009); also of note is a collection of essays edited by Jane Kneller 
and Sidney Axinn (Autonomy and Community: Readings in Contemporary 
Kantian Social Philosophy, Albany: SUNY Press, 1998). 
6
"I myself am a researcher from inclination. I feel the entire thirst for 
knowledge and the eager unrest to go further in it as well as the 
satisfaction with every acquisition. There was a time when I believed that 
this alone could compose the honor of mankind and I despised the rabble 
that knew of nothing. Rousseau brought me around. This blinding 
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' . 
preference vanished, I learned to honor human beings and I would think 
myself less useful than the common laborer if I did not believe that this 
consideration of everything else could impart worth 1n establishing the 
rights of mankind" ("Remarks on the Observations on Feelings of the 
Beautiful and the Sublime," KantsGesammelteSchriften 20: 44). 
7 For a helpful discussion of the systemic importance of the highest good 
for Kant's critical project see Frederick C. Beiser, "Moral Faith and the 
Highest Good" in The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern 
Philosophy. Ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006}, 588-629. 
8Critique of Pure ReasonA 804-805/B 832-833. 
9 
"The field of philosophy in the cosmopolitan sense can be brought down 
to the following questions: 
What can I know? 
What ought I to do? 
What may I hope? 
What is the human being? 
M~taphysics answers the first question, morals the second, religion the 
third, and anthropology the fourth. Fundamentally, however, we could 
reckon all of this to anthropology, because the first three questions refer 
to the last one" (KantsGesammelteSchriften ,JascheLogik9: 25). 
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